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By Harry T. Edwards
Professor of Law,
The University of Michigan
This paper was written by Prof. Edwards following a
presentation on the same subject at the Harvard Institute
for Educational Management during the summer of 1978.
The paper will form the basis of a chapter in Prof Edwards'
forthcoming book, Higher Education and the Law, to be
published by Harvard University in July, 1979.

Some Historical Perspectives
For years institutions of higher education, especially in
the private sector. operated relatively free from direct
regulation by the federal government; during the
nineteenth century. private colleges subsisted mostly on
private donations. The traditional legal view in the
nineteenth century was that society was served not merely
by the continued existence of private colleges but by their
continued independent existence. This view, which was
best articulated by Justice Marshall in the now-famous
Dartmouth College case, rejected the notion that private
colleges were required to function pursuant to a "public
trust" merely because the education of the young was of
great benefit to society. Justice Marshall thus questioned:
That education is an object of national concern and a
proper subject of legislation, all admit. ... But is
education altogether in the hands of government? Does
every teacher of youth become a public officer, and do
donations for the purpose of education necessarily
become public property so far that the will of the
legislature not the will of the donor, becomes the law of
the donation? These questions are of serious moment to
society. and deserve to be well considered. Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819) .
There is good evidence to at least suggest that the decision
in Dartmouth mirrored prevailing political science
viewpoints concerning the proper relationship between
government and institutions of higher education in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 1 Although
several "state universities" had been established by the
turn of the nineteenth century, notably in Georgia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, private
universities were allowed to exist mostly free from state
control. Thus, Dartmouth seemingly endorsed a dominant
societal view that supported "the right of initiating groups
to control what they had created, to gain from the state
equal privileges with all other groups and to retain them
even against the state itself."2
Trustees of Rutgers College in New Jersey v. Richman,
125 A2d 10 (1956), decided nearly 150 years after Justice
Marshall had rendered his opinion in Dartmouth, provides
an interesting contrast. Rutgers, a private college
administered by a self-perpetuating board of trustees, had,
for 30 years prior to the time of litigation, been receiving
increasing amounts of money from the New Jersey treasury.
In the mid-fifties the state legislature passed a charter
amendment hill, very much like the one at issue in
Dartmouth. transferring almost all meaningful control of
the college to a board dominated by public appointees. Two
important factors serve to distinguish Rutgers from
Dartmouth: first, Rutgers could not survive financially
without a continued and, in fact, dramatically increased
infusion of public funds; second, the Rutgers College board
of trustees had consented to the proposed takeover by the
state. The Rutgers opinion accepts as given the financial

dependence of Rutgers on public funding and concludes
that through this relationship the college had evolved from
a private institution, whose trustees were fiduciaries
carrying out a private charter and the wishes of its donors,
to an "instrumentality of the state whose property and
educational facilities are impressed with a public trust for
higher education of the people of the state" (125 A2d at 17).
It is hardly surprising that the state saw fit to take over
Rutgers in the circumstances there presented. What is most
interesting about the Rutgers case, however, is the rationale
offered to support the result achieved. When one reads
Rutgers, it appears that the Chancellor's opinion leaps from
an assertion that (a) private funding is a characteristic of a
private institution to a conclusion that (b) no institution can
remain "private" and receive public funds. This second
proposition surely is not self-evident nor does it follow from
the first.
The problem Rutgers faced is a problem faced today to a
greater or lesser degree by many institutions of higher
learning: the exercise of broad governmental power that
may attend government largesse. The notion that Rutgers, a
private institution, should lose some autonomy when it
chose to accept state money seems, on balance, quite
proper; public funds, after all, must serve some "public
purpose." What seems problematic, however, is the
assumption advanced in Rutgers that the basic educational
"purpose" being served will remain uncompromised by
drastic changes in academic management and control.
The theoretical and philosophical questions raised by
Dartmouth and Rutgers are questions which must be
addressed in dealing with the impact of federal regulation
on higher education. One question is whether public money
imposes a "public trust." If it does, who decides whether
that trust is being furthered or breached and by what
standard? Does the standard change with the proportion or
amount of public funds? Second, does the infusion of public
money bring not only increased public oversight but also an
erosion of the special nature of the institution itself? That is,
assuming that it is possible in 1979 to distinguish between
"public" and "private" colleges and universities, is this
distinction meaningful?
The issue might be better framed by addressing the
differences between educational and noneducational
institutions. Perhaps the mission of institutions of higher
education cannot be performed in an environment
regulated to a degree appropriate for a steel mill. If this is
so, attention should focus not on the public-private
dichotomy but on the important differences between the
"community of scholars" and other potential subjects of
government regulation.
However, claims of institutional "specialness" will be
given short shrift by those who follow the Rutgers line of
reasoning. Education serves a public purpose; it is a public
good . Therefore, the public will inevitably contribute
money and demand some degree of public input and
control. On this view, Rutgers was rightly decided. Perhaps
the Chancellor there was merely recognizing fiscal reality
and social need; "ivory tower" and "community of
scholars" arguments may represent pedagogical concepts
which are luxuries society can no longer afford to support
with public money.
On the other hand, it is clear that focusing on the public
purpose of education yields no ultimate answers. If
education is a public good, society's responsibility is to
provide it in the most effective way. The central question
remains: is education best provided by educational
institutions which are highly regulated or relatively
autonomous? If the former, the Rutgers approach may be
correct; if the latter, the proper view may be that public
money ought to be given to institutions of higher education,
whether public or private, in line with a policy that
emphasizes the value of academic freedom.
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Another issue which goes to the heart of the problem is
that of when "regulation" becomes "control." There is no
rn~1I.debate that at bottom line universities are subject to
mm1mal standards of regulation . For example, in the area
of equal employment opportunity they clearly are not and
should not be entitled to discriminate against Blacks
bscause th ey are black. It is equally clear that direct
governmental control over hiring, promotion, or tenure will
be seen by universities as intolerable intrusions. The grayarea cases necessarily provide the most argument : an
institution will fight for "autonomy" in "academic" matters
and "authority" to administer its "internal affairs." The
~affle words are obvious : on the one hand they reflect
important and abiding policy choices and issues; on the
other hand, "regulation," "control," and others, as applied,
may be no more than labels used to express the institutional
inte rests of the speaker.

so cial legislation . .. to cover higher education. But the
gc_ivernment has recently acted in ways that strike more
d1r.ectly. a.t the central academic functions of colleges and
umvers1t1es.

The Current Situation in Focus
A st~1dy of "law and higher education" will of necessity
focus m large measure on relationships between the federal
government and institutions of higher learning. One sort of
federal "law" of importance to educators is judge-made
law. the paradigmatic example being a Supreme Court
decision construing the United States Constitution. Such a
decision may alter or redefine the " law" in areas such as
due process, equal protection or freedom of expression.
The so-called "Warren Court" of the 1960s handed down
a number of landmark decisions in the areas of school
integration, student conduct, political and civil rights, and
due process that had a significant impact on educational
opportunity and educational institutions. However, the
"Burger Court" of the 1970s has been a less activist court
especially in the enforcement of individual rights, and it
appear~ mstead to have embraced a philosophy of judicial
abstentwn. As a consequence, it is unlikely that the current
Court will be the source of new "law," except that which
seeks to restrict or overturn the constitutional doctrines of
the more activist Warren Court.
. In contrast to the somewhat diminishing importance of
1udge-made law, at least on the federal level, is an
impressive and significant increase in the impact of federal
legislative and administrative control on higher education.
In the last twenty years, the nature of federal involvement
with four-year colleges and universities has changed in a
dramatic fashion. In the fifties the federal government saw
these institutions as important to scientific and medical
research and as the provider of specialized education to a
younger generation whose size and aspirations had grown
enormously since the Second World War. Congress
responded to these needs with appropriations to finance the
construction of new facilities and to provide scholarships
and low-cost loans to students themselves.
By the 1960s government support had increased to the
point where government aid in many cases was likely to
exceed a quarter or even a half of a given university's
budget. Increasing dependence on Washington was a fact of
life but one viewed by many as a necessary cost of the
support and maintenance of first-rate graduate
departments and research facilities . However, as the
character of the link between Washington and academe
evolved from one of financial dependence to one of
financial dependence-coupled-with-regulation it began to
be called into question.
In his.report to the Board of Overseers for the year 197475. President Derek Bok of Harvard University argued that:

In retrospect, it is not surprising that government
chose to play a stronger hand in influencing higher
education. If universities accepted huge sums in
federal aid for research and training, public officials
could not fail to pay attention to the way in which the
tax dollars were spent. .. .
Nevertheless, the rising tide of government
intervention has begun to provoke serious concern
from many colleges and universities. Kingman
Brewster has pointed to "a growing tendency for the
centra~ government to use the spending power to
prescribe education policies." In his colorful phrase,
the government has adopted a philosophy best
described as "now that I have bought the button, I have
a right to design the coat." Other critics have
complained of the mounting costs of complying with
federal regulations , especially at a time when all
educational institutions are hard pressed for funds to
maintain essential academic programs.
Government officials have also had some sharp
coi:iimei:its to make about the attitudes of college and
umvers1ty spokesmen toward Washington .
Congressman John Brademas expressed these
criticisms well by calling for "a little more information
and a little less admonition from the higher education
community." Beneath thde complaints lies a deeper
concern. The quality of government regulation does not
depend simply on the intelligence and judgment of
public officials but on the adequacy of the information
and advice that these officials receive to assist them in
their work . .. .
It is important to examine these complaints and
consider how public officials should employ their
powers over our colleges and universities. Federal
support has played an indispensable role in
strengthening higher education. Having given its aid,
the gov.e~nm.ent is bound to c~ntinue exercising
superv1s10n 1f only because higher education has
become so large and the functions it performs so
critical to the society. Yet precisely because these
functions are so important, it is vital that the
~overnme~t use its powers wisely to protect the public
mterest without weakening the institutions it seeks to
regulate .
A university administrator is presented with a scheme
charact~ri~ed ~y ~xcessive bureaucratization, expense and
competing mshtuhonal values, often in situations in which
priorities have not been established or stand in conflict.
Faced with this picture, the university administrator must
develop a model for analyzing the "cost" of regulation and
compliance and standards for assessment of the positive
and negative results achieved by the enforcement of and
compliance with various schemes of federal regulation.

0

The government has begun to exert its influence in new
ways to encourage colleges and universities to conform to
a variety of public policies. Some of these efforts have
merely taken the form of extending familiar pieces of
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- Rules have been issued to regulate the internal
operations of educational institutions by requiring
them to grant equal admissions to women and minority
groups, to institute grievance procedures in cases of
alleged discrimination, and to open confidential files
for student inspection .. . .
- The work of scientific investigators has been
regulated by restrictions affecting fetal research and
experimentation on human subjects.
- Rather than simply increase federal aid to
universities, Congress has cut certain programs and
expanded others in ways that dramatize the power of
the purse to alter the shape and priorities of the
university ....

Types of Federal Regulation
When one considers how federal regulation impacts on
the human and financial resources of four-vear universities
and colleges, it is helpful to distinguish the 'Various types of
regulation.
One category of regulation includes laws designed to
affect relationships between institutions of higher
education and individuals. In many such cases,
enforcement may contemplate a total termination of federal
funds in the event of noncompliance. (Under this form of
regulation the government may also retain the power to cut
off funds in categories two and three noted herein below.)
A second category of regulation includes direct "grant
fund" programs, with strings attached. Noncompliance with
the "strings attached" forms of regulation may result in
either the loss of the specific grant funds or the total
termination of all federal monies given to the institution for
any purpose .
A third category of regulation includes programs
providing for an infusion of government money to satisfy
more general educational and training needs of society and
to enrich institutions of higher education (e.g.,
Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act of 1971, 42
U.S .C. §292b). Money in this third category may be given
with no strings attached, except, of course, that the money
must be used for the appropriated purpose.
During the past 15 years there has been a massive
increase in federal regulation whether by Presidential
Executive Order or Congressional acts passed pursuant to
the Spending Power and the Commerce Clause under
Article I Section 8 or pursuant to Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment. Some examples are:
1. Executive Order 11246 {as amendedJ - Prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin by all federal government
contractors. Subject to specified limitations and regulations
established by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance,
contractors (including universities) are required to
establish and maintain affirmative action programs to
eliminate and prevent discrimination.
2. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 {42 U.S.C.
§2000dJ - Prohibition against exclusion from, participation
in, denial of benefits, and discrimination under federally
assisted programs on the basis of race, color, or national
origin.
3. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 {20
U.S .C. §1681}- Prohibits educational institutions that
receive federal funds from discrimination on the basis of
sex.
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 {42 U.S .C.
§2000e} - Equal Employment Opportunity Act-Prohibits
(with minor exceptions) employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion , sex, or national origin. The Act
creates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and empowers it to prevent acts defined by Title
VII as unlawful by investigating charges of discrimination,
effecting conciliation when appropriate, and bringing a
civil action when conciliation fails. In addition Title VII
creates a private right of action in certain circumstances.
5. Buckley Amendment {Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act 20 U.S.C. §1232g {1974))-Regulates and limits
the use to be made of information in student files.
6. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 {29 U.S.C. §794)-Section 504
provides that "no otherwise qualified handicapped
individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, denied the benefits of,
or be subject to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
7. The Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of
1976, Pub. L. No . 94-484-Expresses a Congressional
determination that overspecialization in the medical
profession has resulted in an inadequate number of

primary-care physicians. Since persons in the health
professions are viewed as a national health resource and
the federal government shares the responsibility of
assuring that they are available to meet the health needs of
the Am erican peopl e, the act states that "it is therefore
appropriate to provide support for [their] education and
training .. . in a mann er which will assure the availability
of health professions personnel to all of the American
people ."

Is Compliance Practicable?
Institutions of higher education face increasingly
complex bureaucracies administering extensive,
overlapping and sometimes inconsistent regulations. For
example, in the area of equal employment opportunity,
employment practices of higher education institutions are
regulated and administered by:
1. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
2. Department of Labor
3. Department of Justice
4. Vari ous state agencies
These agencies (along with private party litigants in certain
cases), enforce:
1. Title VII and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
2. §§ 1981 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1871 (42 U.S.C.)
3. Executive Order 11246
4. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
5. State laws
Or, looked at in the context of a more narrowly drawn
problem, a university or college dealing with the problem of
sex discrimination in the area of faculty hiring and
promotion must consider the application of at least five
pieces of federal and state regulation:
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972)
2. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. §206) (amended
by the Education Amendments of 1972)
3. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
4. Executive Order 11246 (as amended by E.O. 11375)
5. State Fair Employment Practices acts
This proliferation of regulation has resulted in protest or
at least expressions of serious concern from university
administrators and federal regulators alike . The
administrative agencies are being whipsawed by the
conflicting demands of their two constituencies : the
regulated institutions pressuring them for practicable
solutions and the public and especially designated
beneficiaries of regulation seeking "full compliance."

The Buckley Amendment: A Paradigm
How does a representative piece of federal regulation
impact on the human and financial resources of an
institution? A useful answer must involve an applied as
well as a theoretical analysis.
For example, the Buckley Amendment, which reaches far
into the affairs of institutions of higher education, was
passed without benefit of full public hearings on or
committee consideration of the abuses at which it was
directed or the costs it would impose. One cost to be
measured is financial and administrative. Thus, for
instance , the "cost" of compliance to a small, financially
strapped college may be measurable not only in dollars but
in academic programs unfunded .
In addition to paper work and bureaucratization, the
Buckley Amendment has also imposed "costs" in terms of
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academic discretion which may negatively affect other
federal policies. Admissions officers may claim that
recommendations in student files have become blander and
less informative ; hence admissions decisions must often be
made on the basis of grades and scores on standardized
tests not geared to producing an optimally diverse or
unbiased pattern of acceptances.
Yet another problem which has received some attention
is the implications of the Buckley Amendment for
educational researchers; some have contended that the
"privacy aspects " of the law may in some instances render
the university unable to evaluate its own performance
because of lack of access to its own information .
Some Perspectives on the Regulation Issue
In a more general vein, there are a number of important
policy questions that must be answered in any examination
of the impact of federal regulation on higher education.
Some of these questions are outlined hereinbelow:
Individual Versus Institutional Rights- Although
protection of the rights of groups and institutions under the
rubric of freedom of association has certain intellectual
appeal, how do we deal with our suspicions about the
motives of those who protest that their group will be injured
or destroyed if exposed to external regulation? The
problem becomes more complex when the form of
regulation at issue is one designed not to serve general
governmental aims but to protect the rights of individuals.
Essentially the problem posed is one of perspective. When
regulation is imposed on a small institution by the federal
or state government, the institution looks small and
helpless. But if looked at from the perspective of an
individual whose rights are being protected from intrusion
or denial by the institution, the problem looks quite
different.
Perceived Versus Actual Impact- Granting the need for
and appropriateness of certain forms of federal regulation,
how do we measure impact on an educational institution?
Can we meaningfully distinguish and compare perceived
impact and actual impact? This impact may be measured in
terms of its cost, whether to the institution or to government,
or in terms of its resultant measurable social change. For
example , in the case of HEW-mandated hiring of women
faculty under E.0.11246 we might ask:
1. How many women would not have been hired by
institution X but for federal policy, federal intervention or
threat of sanction? Did these people fill existing positions?
2. How do these women compare to other faculty in terms
of performance, retention, promotion, and tenure?
3. At what cost to the institution was this "progress"
achieved? We might inquire as to subjective costs: Was
financial or other discretion eliminated? Was institutional
dignity somehow violated? We would also wish to measure
actual cost in dollars: How much has been spent on hiring
and salaries? How much has been spent on public relations
and "compliance" paperwork?
4. At what cost to government was this progress achieved?
Can w·e determine the cost of obtaining compliance at this
institution? Can we estimate total program cost and divide
by the number of jobs procured? Can we measure the
extent of the litigation in which HEW is involved on this
issue? In relation to good results? In relation to number of
cases settled informally by other procedures?
The Concept of Regulatory Maturity- The way in which
an academic institution copes with a given regulatory
scheme may be related to the "maturity" of the legislation
itself or the institution's relationship with the relevant
administrative body. One thesis might be that new, and
hence as a practical matter unknown, legislation will create
a level of institutional uncertainty which is bound to
engender a storm of protest addressed more to the
18

uncertainty itself than to the merits or demerits of a new
program. On this theory, any start-up cost is perceived as
extremely high and as requiring protest purely as a matter
of principle. On the other hand, difficulties reported in
dealing with mature schemes of regulation would tend to
focus more on details and problems of actual
implementation and to reflect on on-going relationships
between the institution, government agency, and a relevant
public.
Another theory would be that institutions find it less
burdensome to comply with new regulations when
standards are somewhat amorphous and enforcement lax ,
and more difficult to comply with exacting standards later
on. If a pattern were to emerge, it would be possible to
derive a compliance model based on statute maturity that
would be capable of generalization and refinement.
The Concept of Regulatory Process-Does the form of
regulation matter? If what we are talking about is the
preservation of both educational institutions and
legislatively expressed substantive moral values, are there
patterns of regulation or enforcement more likely than
others to serve these competing ends? Could a partial
answer be found in political process? For example, before
issuing proposed regulations under §504, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare held 10 meetings across the
country to which interested parties were invited to offer
their comments and recommendations concerning
implementation. Former HEW Secretary Mathews
expressed satisfaction with the results of this "early and
more meaningful" public involvement in the regulatory
process. Discussion in the proposed rules (45 CFR Part 84)
highlights modifications made in response to public
comment. Mathews' expressed goal was to make HEW more
"legislative" ; under his leadership HEW actively sought
public input in order to make more "representative"
decisions . The agency's orientation was to negotiation and
conciliation rather than enforcement. Policy choices in
favor of public input are intuitively satisfying, but we must
attend to substance as well as form: Do they result in
regulations better suited to the legislative purpose? Do they
result in regulations more likely to engender compliance?
Do they result in regulations better only for the vocal
interest groups involved whose motives or needs may be in
conflict with those of the "public" generally?
Who is the Proper Decisioh-Maker?-This suggests the
question of where policy judgments should be made and
that of where in fact they are made. Is a particular question
properly one for Congress, for an administrative agency, or
for the university itself? Assuming a principled basis on
which to decide such theoretical questions, it remains a
matter of practical interest to learn what really happens
and at what level. Whether in Congress, HEW, or the
University, is it a general or a foot soldier who is likely to
make the critical choices?
Talk Moy Be Cheaper than Compliance- Policy choices
can he made through appropriations without any ostensible
change in the substantive declarations of existing statutes.
How does an educational institution deal with regulations
when, due to inadequate manpower or funds or changes in
the political climate, the enforcement effort is seriously
diminished? How does nonenforcement affect short-run
decisions such as whether to hire individual A or B? How
does it affect long-run decisions and planning, such as
whether to invest thought and effort in developing a fullscale affirmative action plan? Further, should we be
concerned about keeping regulations on the books which
invite random and discriminatory enforcement?
What Protection Does the Community of Scholars Need?
What Protection Can Society Afford to Render?-There
seems to he a generally accepted belief that institutions of
higher education are "special" and deserving of special
treatment; if educators hope to advocate this view to inform

national policy, it must be defined and limited. If some
freedoms are essential to the "community of scholars," we
need to know what they are and what values they promote.
Assuming that we can identify qualities essential to the
existence of the community of scholars, we must consider in
any given case whether academic integrity should be
permitted to override competing values. More specifically:
1. In some cases will academic needs out-balance federal
goals altogether? This question asks whether the essential
nature of the university qua university can withstand
certain forms of intrusion.
2. In other cases, e.g., equality of educational opportunity,
federal regulation is clearly appropriate. Should the special
nature of educational institutions mandate particular
methods of federal treatment and proscribe others?
The aim of these questions is to isolate and identify some
of the considerations relevant to an analysis of the
relationship between legislative or administrative "law"
and higher education. Clearly, the same or similar issues
will arise in the context of judge-made law as well. It is
hoped that these questions will provide the reader with
some stimulus for reflection.
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